Purpose. The U.S. Coast Guard issues findings of concern to disseminate information related to unsafe conditions that were identified as causal factors to a casualty and could contribute to future incidents. Findings of concern are intended to educate the public, state, and local agencies about the conditions discovered so they may address the findings with an appropriate voluntary
action or highlight existing applicable company policies or state/local regulations.

The Incident. On January 29, 2026, a fire occurred inside a free-fall lifeboat on a foreignflagged bulk carrier anchored in Portland, Maine. While troubleshooting a lifeboat engine starting issue in preparation for a scheduled U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Port State Control examination, the vessel’s crew attempted to use two space heaters to warm the engine. After the fire started in the lifeboat, the crew was able to extinguish it; however, the lifeboat was declared a total loss.

Contributing Factors and Analysis. The subsequent USCG investigation determined that the initiating event for this casualty was the crew plugging two 2000-Watt portable space heaters into a single, light-duty extension cord reel. This unsafe and improvised procedure led directly to the fire.

The causal factors include:

• Gross Electrical Overload: The two space heaters drew a combined 18.2 Amps, exceeding the extension cord’s maximum rating of 16 Amps. The cord’s maximum rating is only valid under ideal conditions (i.e., fully uncoiled).
• Use of a Coiled Extension Cord: With the extension cord left coiled on its reel, its safe current-carrying capacity would have been de-rated. As a result, the 18.2 Amp load caused extreme and rapid resistive heating, which melted the PVC insulation and likely ignited the plastic reel and/or surrounding combustible materials.
• Inadequate Equipment and Unauthorized Procedure: The use of a higher-grade (AWG) light-duty extension cord for a high-power industrial application was unsafe.
  Furthermore, the decision to use portable space heaters within the enclosed space of a lifeboat instead of using the designed heating element installed on the engine was an unauthorized deviation from standard procedure.
• Failure of Overcurrent Protection: The ship’s main circuit breaker did not trip because the 18.2 Amp load was below its activation threshold. This “protection gap” allowed the cord to fail catastrophically.
• Failure in Procedural Adherence and Risk Assessment: The crew resorted to an unsafe practice because they were unable to start the lifeboat engine in cold weather and time restrictions deterred them from using the designed heating element on the engine.

Findings of Concern. USCG investigators have identified the following measures to help mitigate the risks associated with the causal factors identified in this and similar electrical fire investigations:

• Do not use space heaters or other high-wattage appliances in lifeboats, on vessel weather decks, or in other marine environments for which they are not designed.
• Ensure all extension cords used onboard vessels are commercial or industrial-grade and clearly marked with a wire gauge and power rating appropriate for the intended electrical load.
• Implement procedures and conduct training requiring that extension cord reels be fully unspooled before being connected to any significant electrical load to prevent heat buildup and catastrophic failure.

Closing. These findings of concern are provided for informational purposes only and do not relieve any domestic or international safety, operational, or material requirements. For any questions or comments, please contact Sector Northern New England Investigations Division by email at NNEIO@uscg.mil.